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EPIC GAMES V. APPLE: TECH-TYING AND THE
FUTURE OF ANTITRUST *
Emma C. Smizer†
Antitrust and “Big Tech” firms are under renewed scrutiny, in part due
to the dispute between Epic Games and Apple. This lawsuit strikes at the
heart of the growing phenomenon of “tech-tying,” a form of vertical integration in digital aftermarkets where monopolistic tech firms condition the use
of their operating systems on the added use of other complimentary software
or services. Judicial attitude toward claims of tying has shifted considerably
over recent decades, resulting in lax enforcement against vertical integration
arrangements. This Comment argues that Apple’s conduct constitutes “techtying” and that competitors should be permitted to enter the aftermarkets of
both iOS app distribution and iOS in-app payments processing. Antitrust
laws must evolve from its industrial-era origins to account for today’s hightech industry by expanding to protect competition.

*
Although the printing process will result in this Comment being published after the May 2021 Epic
Games v. Apple bench trial in the Northern District of California, the Comment was finalized prior
to the trial. The analysis in this Comment will remain relevant to issues likely to be considered on
appeal in this case and parallel issues likely to arise in other cases.
†
J.D. Candidate at Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School, Class of 2022. The author
would like to thank Professor Lauren Willis, Associate Dean for Research at Loyola Law School,
for her invaluable feedback and exhaustive editing. The author would also like to thank David
Kesselman, Professor of Antitrust Law at Loyola Law School, for being generous with his time and
insights. She would like to express her gratitude to the staff and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review for their assistance and patience. Lastly, the author would like to thank
her friends and family who listened, nodded, and looked interested.
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INTRODUCTION

On the afternoon of July 29, 2020, Tim Cook raised his right hand and
swore his testimony would be true and correct, so help him, God. 1 In his
opening statement before the Congressional antitrust hearings, Cook asserted
that Apple users give the iPhone a “99% satisfaction rating,” even while facing “fierce competition” in the smartphone market. 2 “We do not have a dominant share in any market or any product category where we do business,”
claimed Cook. 3 Yet in 2019, Apple earned 66% of the global profit share in
the handset market. 4 Cook also stated that app developers do not pay for any
metaphorical “shelf space” in the iOS App Store, despite charging a 30% fee
to developers on any purchases made through the App Store. 5 Shortly after
the close of these hearings, Apple became the world’s most valuable publicly
traded company, reaching a $2 trillion market cap. 6
Antitrust has been thrust into the spotlight yet again as the United States
government grapples with whether these tech giants have unfairly dominated
the market. In light of the hearings, Congress released a “blockbuster” antitrust report in October 2020, with more than 440 pages devoted to criticizing
the business practices of big tech companies, including Apple, and suggesting a new path for antitrust laws. 7 The House Subcommittee on Antitrust
1. CNET, Google, Apple, and ALL the Tech Billionaires Fight Antitrust Against Congress
(full hearing), YOUTUBE (July 29, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ht-zdeMwxbw&ab
_channel=CNET [https://perma.cc/4G5Q-732F].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. William Gallagher, Apple Earned 66% of the Entire Smartphone Market’s Profits in
2019, APPLE INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2019), https://appleinsider.com/articles/19/12/19/apple-earned-66of-the-entire-smartphone-markets-profits-in-2019#:~:text=The%20global%20profits%20from%20cell,66%25%20or%20almost%20%248%20billion
[https://perma.cc/C5JDYP2T].
5. CNET, supra note 1; Jack Nicas et al., Fortnite Creator Sues Apple and Google After
Ban From App Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/technology/apple-fortnite-ban.html [https://perma.cc/A5X2-U75H].
6. Sergei Klebnikov, Apple Becomes First U.S. Company Worth More Than $2 Trillion,
FORBES (Aug. 19, 2020, 3:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2020/08/19/apple-becomes-first-us-company-worth-more-than-2-trillion/#5435c2bc66e6
[perma.cc/A3F8P86W].
7. Adi Robertson & Russell Brandom, Congress Releases Blockbuster Tech Antitrust Report, VERGE (Oct. 6, 2020, 4:53 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/10/6/21504814/congress-
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expressed concerns over Apple’s “durable” market power, maintained
through “high switching costs, ecosystem lock-in, and brand loyalty.” 8 The
report goes on to suggest various solutions, such as “reasserting the original
intent” of antitrust laws to include protection for “not just consumers, but
also workers, entrepreneurs, independent businesses, open markets, a fair
economy, and democratic ideals.” 9
In August 2020, Apple faced renewed scrutiny in a lawsuit brought by
video-game developer, Epic Games, Inc. (“Epic”) in the Northern District
Court of California. 10 Earlier that month, Epic violated Apple’s terms of
service when Epic permitted its users to bypass Apple’s internal payment
processing mechanism, In-App Purchase (“IAP”), by using their own direct
payment system. 11 Epic gave a 20% discount to customers who used its own
direct payment system and asserted that this change in price reflected potential consumer savings if Epic was no longer required to give 30% of its earnings on in-app purchases to Apple. 12 Apple promptly removed Fortnite from
the iOS App Store, triggering a carefully constructed media campaign from
Epic that mimicked Apple’s own advertisement homage to the dystopian future portrayed in George Orwell’s 1984. 13 Epic’s campaign video tracks
Apple’s own commercial nearly frame-for-frame, making an explicit suggestion that Apple has now become the dystopic autocrat. 14 The two tech
antitrust-report-house-judiciary-committee-apple-google-amazon-facebook
/9SMK-WEZ7].

[https://perma.cc

8. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 334 (Comm.
Print 2020).
9. Id. at 392.
10. Nicas et al., supra note 5.
11. Id.
12. Complaint at 7, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
13, 2020), 2020 WL 5073937.
13. The Fortnite Team, #FreeFortnite, EPIC GAMES (Nov. 17, 2020), https://
www.epicgames.com/fortnite/en-US/news/freefortnite [https://perma.cc/WEB4-9F4L]; Reuters
Staff, Apple’s Famous ‘1984’ Video Parodied by Fortnite Game Maker, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2020,
3:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-epic-games-1984/apples-famous-1984-videoparodied-by-fortnite-game-maker-idUSKCN25935X [https://perma.cc/4MAE-MGUZ].
14. Reuters Staff, supra note 13.
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companies have since locked horns in the courts, with Epic filing its complaint for antitrust violations against Apple. 15
In its complaint, Epic alleged that Apple has created an illegal “tying”
arrangement by linking the use of its smartphones to both its App Store and
subsequently Apple’s IAP system. 16 To understand how #FreeFortnite began trending on Twitter, it is important to examine how the U.S. antitrust
jurisprudence led us here, and how the Northern District’s decision is leading
us forward.
This Comment focuses on the inconsistent treatment of tying claims by
U.S. courts 17 and the issue of tying presented in Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple,
Inc. Part II defines tying arrangements and examines the relationship between tying and market power. Part II then explores the subtle distinction
between conduct judged under per se and rule of reason standards. The U.S.
government and its courts have a complex, and often contradictory, relationship with antitrust laws, undergoing a gradual yet dramatic shift adjudicating
claims of tying. Part III expands upon the instant case, Epic Games v. Apple,
and explains what arguments may propel Epic’s case forward. Part III additionally compares Epic Games v. Apple with two watershed decisions dealing with tying and bundling in digital markets. Part IV argues that Apple’s
conduct constitutes an illegal tying arrangement which has and continues to
unreasonably restrain virtual trade. Part IV also assesses how Apple’s conduct is effective through its significant leverage in iOS aftermarkets and
lacks any legitimate procompetitive justifications that may challenge Epic’s
tying claims.
The antitrust laws of the early 20th century must be construed to protect
competition in order to promote a healthy, functioning economy. Therefore,
this Comment suggests that the scope of antitrust laws should be expanded
to protect small businesses, entrepreneurs, and workers, rather than focus
solely on consumer welfare. With an estimated value of $17.3 billion, Epic
is not a small business 18—yet the principles the company seeks to vindicate
15. The Fortnite Team, supra note 13.
16. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 57.
17. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND
ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 5.02 (Carolina Acad. Press 7th ed. 2019).
18. Ryan Browne, Fortnite Creator Epic Games is Now Valued at $17.3 Billion After
Blockbuster Funding Deal, CNBC (Aug. 6, 2020, 10:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/06
/fortnite-creator-epic-games-is-now-valued-at-17point3-billion.html
[https://perma.cc/5VKSZGDY].
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could benefit many small players that otherwise would not be willing or able
to shoulder such costly litigation. This Comment posits that, in the case of
Epic Games v. Apple, Apple’s conduct constitutes illicit “tech-tying” and
thus, Apple’s control in the aftermarkets of both iOS app distribution and inapp payments processing must be limited.

II. BACKGROUND
In the early 20th century, capitalism flourished in the United States,
virtually unfettered by the budding attempts at antitrust regulation. 19 Although robust antitrust enforcement briefly followed this period of economic
growth, judicial attitude toward antitrust laws has fluctuated considerably
over the past century. 20 Antitrust laws generally prohibit firms with market
power from engaging in anticompetitive conduct, such as creating vertical
restraints or tying agreements, the practice of controlling distinct links within
the production or distribution chain. 21 The doctrine of tying has experienced
“the greatest change in the last 50 years” when compared to other areas of
antitrust law. 22 Courts judge claims of antitrust violations under either per
se illegality or the rule of reason standard, but these analyses have a unique
relationship to tying arrangements. 23 The following subsections define these
relevant terms dealing with tying arrangements in antitrust laws and expand
upon the varying treatment of tying claims by the courts through history into
the modern era.

A. Tying and Market Power Defined
Tying occurs when a party sells one product, known as the “tying”
product, with the added condition that the consumer also purchase a separate

19. Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antirust
Movement, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirthof-the-u-s-antitrust-movement [https://perma.cc/9TRZ-VVN4].
20. Id.
21. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.01.
22. Id.
23. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1248–49 (2008).
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or “tied” product. 24 In effect, the buyer cannot purchase the first good or
service without also purchasing or utilizing the second good or service from
the seller. 25 Tying arrangements are a form of vertical restraint where one
firm creates interdependent agreements between markets, for example, by
conditioning the purchase of a lamp with the added condition of also buying
a lamp shade from the same firm. 26 In the case of tying, one firm may foreclose inter-brand competition by bundling certain tied goods or services with
the tying product. 27
The practice of tying “undermines competition on the merits by enabling a firm with market power in one market to privilege products or services in a distinct market.” 28 Federal law attempts to prevent anticompetitive
conduct by prohibiting firms with sufficient market power from exploiting
these vertical restraints. 29 However, not all tying arrangements are illegal 30
and vertical restraints are generally considered less inherently anticompetitive, making it difficult for claimants to prevail on claims of tying. 31 Further,
as a prerequisite, claimants must also establish that the defendant possesses
sufficient market power in the tying product market. 32
A firm’s market power is essential to tying claims. 33 A firm must have
“appreciable economic power” within the tying product market, otherwise
24. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.01.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 37–38.
28. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 398.
29. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02; Scott Mah et. al., Antitrust Violations, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 413, 422 (2020).
30. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 (1984) (“It is clear, however,
that not every refusal to sell two products separately can be said to restrain competition.”).
31. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.01.
32. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
33. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) (“Our cases have
concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product
that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different
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consumers face little pressure to purchase the firm’s tied products. 34 Courts
define “market power” as a firm’s capacity to raise prices above competitive
levels or to exclude competition. 35 Market power can often be inferred by a
firm’s “possession of a predominant share of the market” 36 or through more
precise mathematic formulas. 37 Determining market power also requires defining the relevant product and the geographic market. 38 For example, a firm
may possess market power domestically in the U.S. but lack the same power
worldwide. 39 Further, courts have recognized that a single product may provide its own relevant market for antitrust purposes within a secondary market
for parts or services. 40 After proving market power, claimants must then
fulfil specific elements of tying claims to prevail.

B. Per Se Illegality and its Misleading Relationship to Tying
American jurisprudence has carved two distinct and well-worn paths
of antitrust analyses: per se illegality and conduct judged under the “rule of
reason” standard. 41 The per se approach applies to conduct that, on its face,
has such a detrimental effect on competition that it is presumed to violate
antitrust laws without the need for a robust inquiry into the alleged harm. 42
To improve judicial efficiency and economy, courts use the per se categorical
terms. When such ‘forcing’ is present, competition on the merits in the market for the tied item is
restrained and the Sherman Act is violated.”); see also Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d
101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The core element of a monopolization claim is market power, which is
defined as “the ability to raise price by restricting output.”).
34. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992).
35. United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
36. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464.
37. E.g., SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 2.06.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 2.06; see also Eastman Kodak Co.,
504 U.S. at 471.
41. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1212.
42. Id. at 1213–14.
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approach for “manifestly anticompetitive” 43 conduct and are not concerned
with a fact-driven analysis of a firm’s actions or possible competitive justifications. 44
To further complicate matters, the application of per se analysis to
claims of tying dramatically departs from the typical categorical approach of
other antitrust claims. 45 The approach of per se tying sets a high threshold
for parties seeking redress, requiring a claimant to prove: (1) the tied products are two separate products, (2) the defendant has sufficient market power
in the market of the tied product, (3) the defendant affords the consumer no
choice but to purchase the tied product, and (4) a substantial amount of commerce is foreclosed by the tied product. 46 Unlike “true” or typical per se
scenarios that are resolved without any in-depth factual inquiry, 47 a claimant
must prove these elements to prevail on a claim of per se tying. 48 Further,
per se defendants are not normally allowed to argue any “business rationales
which validate their conduct.” 49 Yet, courts generally tend to resolve claims
of antitrust violations under the rule of reason analysis which, in contrast to
per se illegality, relies heavily upon an ad-hoc analysis of whether the alleged
conduct unreasonably restricts trade. 50
Therefore, per se tying is only nominally per se because it requires a
factual inquiry to adjudicate tying claims. 51 If a plaintiff cannot prove all
four elements of per se tying, they may still recover under the rule of reason
43. Gary Myers, Tying Arrangements and the Computer Industry: Digidyne Corp. v. Data
General Corp., 1985 DUKE L.J. 1027, 1028 (1985).
44. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1213–14.
45. Id. at 1217.
46. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Lemley &
Leslie, supra note 23, at 1249.
47. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1249.
48. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
49. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1249.
50. Id. at 1214–15 (“The vast majority of trade-restraint categories receive rule of reason
treatment. In contrast to the per se rule, which eschews in-depth investigation, in rule of reason
cases ‘the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.’”).
51. Id. at 1249.
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standard, though this is not typically a “promising alternative.” 52 Here, Epic
pled in the alternative that Apple’s conduct should be judged under the rule
of reason standard. 53

C. Rule of Reason Tying
The delineation between per se and rule of reason analysis blurs significantly when applied to claims of tying. 54 Courts continue to use the per se
label when adjudicating tying claims but have modified per se tying by adding elements that strongly resemble the typical rule of reason standard. 55
While claimants must still prove the same elements of per se tying in alleging
rule of reason tying, there is one important distinction: Courts must also
weigh the procompetitive benefits of the defendant’s conduct against the potential for anticompetitive harm. 56 In cases involving tying, the rule of reason standard allows courts to measure the potentially chilling effect on innovation against actual anticompetitive effects within the market at issue. 57
Thus, tying claims evaluated under the rule of reason standard are often
dismissed on the grounds that the claimant has failed to demonstrate a “significant anticompetitive effect” caused by the defendant’s conduct. 58 When
dealing with digital markets, courts may be reticent to use the per se label,
and instead opt to apply the rule of reason standard. 59 However, for claims
of tying, no clear preference between per se and rule of reason analysis exists
52. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
53. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 54.
54. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02 (“Given the Court’s more recent
tying decisions there is a question of whether tying has finally slipped from a ‘soft’ per se to a rule
of reason analysis. At this point it appears that it has not, at least not quite.”); Lemley & Leslie,
supra note 23, at 1250 (“While it may seem of no moment whether tie-ins are called per se illegal
so long as they are evaluated under their own modified rule of reason, the miscategorization of
tying arrangements has consequences.”).
55. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1250.
56. Id. at 1251.
57. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
58. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1251.
59. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1500–02
(2019).
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where digital markets are implicated, 60 perhaps in part due to the “illplaced” 61 label of per se. The future of tying law remains unclear as the
amorphous category of per se tying shifts ever closer to resemble rule of
reason tying. 62

D. The Development of Tying Jurisprudence
Judicial enforcement of antitrust laws against tying arrangements has
waxed and waned markedly throughout the past century. 63 The Sherman
Act, enacted in 1890, was designed to impede companies from monopolizing
their respective markets and undermining competition. 64 Only two sentences
long, section 1 of the Sherman Act explicitly outlaws any “contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy” that restricts or restrains trade either among states or internationally. 65 Section 2 of the Sherman Act further outlaws any actual monopolization, attempted
monopolization, and conspiracy between parties to monopolize trade. 66 In
1914, the U.S. government strengthened its antitrust laws through the Clayton Act, supplementing the Sherman Act by prohibiting specific anticompetitive behavior. 67 Similarly, the California Cartwright Act also prohibits
trusts, which are defined as a “combination of capital, skill or acts by two or
more persons” that restrict or limit commerce. 68 Yet, courts have been
60. Id. at 1499–500 (“No explicitly different rules for digital markets emerged in subsequent years, and there is widespread agreement that none are needed. Of course, analysts continue
to take the unique characteristics of each relevant market into account on a case-by-case basis. But
the rules themselves do not (in theory, at least) vary based on the type of market at issue.”).
61. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1250.
62. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
63. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19, at 2.
64. Id. at 3.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
66. Id.
67. Gregory T. Jenkins & Robert W. Bing, Abstract, Microsoft’s Monopoly: Anti-Competitive Behavior, Predatory Tactics, And The Failure Of Governmental Will, 5 J. BUS. & ECON.
RESEARCH 11, 12 (2007).
68. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (1941).

SMIZER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

EPIC GAMES V. APPLE

5/16/2021 11:31 PM

225

reluctant to enforce these antitrust laws 69 as judicial attitude toward tying
arrangements has changed considerably over the years. 70
In 1936, the Supreme Court found illicit tying where IBM conditioned
the leasing of its machines on the added lease of its tabulating cards, because
IBM’s conduct “substantially lessened competition,” and thus violated section 3 of the Clayton Act. 71 In International Salt Company v. United States,
the Supreme Court went on to strengthen its position on tying arrangements
in 1947 when it affirmed summary judgment against a salt machine manufacturer for tying the use of its patented machines to the purchase of its own
salt product. 72 The International Salt Company court held that it was “unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market.” 73
Again in 1958, the Supreme Court found that the North Pacific Railway
Company had violated antitrust laws by conditioning the leasing of its land
upon the lessee’s use of North Pacific for all shipping needs. 74 Here, the
Court clarified that tying arrangements are “unreasonable in and of themselves” when a firm has “sufficient economic power” to “appreciably restrain
free competition in the market for the tied product.” 75
However, antitrust enforcement experienced a marked decline by the
late 1970s, 76 preceded by the 1969 Supreme Court decision in Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel (“Fortner I”). 77 The issue before the Fortner
I court was whether tying credit toward the purchase of land to the condition
of building prefabricated homes created by the lender’s parent company

69. Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 569, 577 (2004).
70. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
71. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936).
72. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 402 (1947).
73. Id. at 396.
74. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
75. Id. at 6.
76. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.
77. Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 78 The Court reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant and remanded to resolve the issue of market
power. 79 Fortner I effectively reasserted the necessity of market power in
the tying product market as a prerequisite to prevail on claims of tying. 80
Eight years later, the Supreme Court returned to this issue in Fortner II, holding the evidence did not support the assertion that the defendant possessed
sufficient market power in the credit market. 81
In 1984, the Supreme Court dealt with tying again when an anesthesiologist brought suit against Jefferson Hospital for contracting exclusively
with an anesthesiologist firm, thus conditioning the use of its hospital services to the anesthesiologic services. 82 The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit decision, which initially had found the agreement to be per se tying, and
indicated in its holding that 30% market share would not constitute market
power for the purposes of per se tying. 83 In Justice O’Connor’s concurrence,
she argued that “[t]he time has therefore come to abandon the “per se” label,”
urging the court to instead examine the potential anticompetitive effects of a
defendant’s conduct rather than outright condemn such vertical restraints. 84
However, the majority of Court asserted it was “far too late” in the history
of the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence to treat tying arrangements as anything
but per se illegal, and thus kept the per se label despite adopting rule of reason elements. 85
The Fortner and Jefferson Hospital cases were part of a broader ideological shift toward “self-correcting markets” and away from prohibiting

78. Id. at 497; see also SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
79. Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 505–07.
80. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
81. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02; see also United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
82. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 5 (1984); see also SULLIVAN &
HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
83. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 26; see also SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
84. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, concurring).
85. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1249–50.
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vertical restraints. 86 The prevailing theory at this time posited there was no
need for additional antitrust enforcement to “maintain the conditions necessary” for competition; rather, these markets would naturally self-regulate
even with the emergence of monopoly powers. 87

E. Antitrust in the Modern Era
Antitrust laws were written at a time when technology was still undergoing rapid development. Critics of antitrust regulation in the technology
sector suggest that the “pace of technological change is so swift . . . no firm
can hold monopoly power in a high technology market for a meaningful period.” 88 Courts have also established a “confusing and inconsistent standard”
when applying antitrust laws to the high technology industry and digital markets. 89 This lack of consistent antitrust enforcement could deter new companies from entering certain technological markets due to the “exclusionary
conduct” from “individual firms with monopoly power.” 90 Today, the U.S.
continues to grapple with free-market dogma and its competing antitrust interests under increasingly outdated laws. 91
In 2006, the Supreme Court returned to the antitrust doctrine of tying
when a defendant tied its unpatented ink to the use of its patented printheads
and ink containers. 92 In its opinion, the Court openly observed that “[o]ver
the years, this Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially diminished[,]” solidifying the marked departure of American courts
from past years of antitrust regulation. 93 The Court clarified that the
86. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19; see generally SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17,
at § 5.02.
87. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.
88. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Article, A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology
Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 70 (2002).
89. Id. at 72.
90. Id.
91. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8.
92. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31–32 (2006); see also SULLIVAN
& HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
93. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 35.
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application of so-called per se tying would only extend to instances where
there is a “probability of anticompetitive consequences.” 94
In the modern era of antitrust, government regulation has ebbed significantly, continuing to rely on a “distorted” belief of self-correcting markets. 95
Recently, in 2019, Apple CEO Tim Cook disclosed that Apple bought twenty
to twenty-five smaller businesses over a six-month period and, on average,
Apple acquires a new company every two to three weeks. 96 Nonetheless,
Apple tends to purchase smaller companies, perhaps avoiding large acquisitions that may draw unwanted government attention. 97
The sheer dominance of tech companies may finally be motivating a
shift back to a “progressive, anti-monopoly, New Brandeis School” approach
to antitrust regulation. 98 In February 2020, the Federal Trade Commission
announced it would require Apple and other tech giants to “provide information about prior acquisitions not reported to the antitrust agencies” dating
back ten years. 99 The U.S. Department of Justice also recently filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google in what has been described as the “most aggressive U.S. legal challenge” in more than two decades. 100 Antitrust regulation
may be especially needed in digital markets where “a few key gatekeepers”
maintain a vice-like grip on the industry, making it “hard, if not impossible,”
for entrants to compete with these “dominant super-platforms.” 101 The
House Subcommittee on Antitrust recommends in its recent report that the
legislature reassert that “conditioning access to a product or service in which
94. Id. at 37.
95. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.
96. Lauren Feiner, Apple Buys a Company Every Few Weeks, Says CEO Tim Cook, CNBC
(May 6, 2019, 8:59 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/06/apple-buys-a-company-every-fewweeks-says-ceo-tim-cook.html [https://perma.cc/XF4T-45K2].
97. Id.
98. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.
99. FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions by Large Technology Companies, FED. TRADE
COMM’N., (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-examinepast-acquisitions-large-technology-companies [https://perma.cc/57WX-5YP6].
100. Brent Kendall & Rob Copeland, Justice Department Hits Google With Antitrust Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 20, 2020, 8:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-tofile-long-awaited-antitrust-suit-against-google-11603195203 [https://perma.cc/4LN8-CQUM].
101. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.
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a firm has market power to the purchase or use of a separate product or service is anticompetitive.” 102 This mounting scrutiny may ultimately play out
in Epic’s favor as the courts and legislature move toward a new age of antitrust enforcement against such “Big Tech” giants. As the jurisprudence of
tying stands now, the definition of the tying product market may be outcomedeterminative for Epic’s success or failure.

III. TECH-TYING IN DIGITAL AFTERMARKETS
On August 13, 2020, Epic Games, Inc. filed its complaint against Apple, alleging Apple engaged in anti-competitive conduct and thus violated
both California state and federal law by exerting monopolistic control over
the iOS app distribution market and the in-app payment processing market. 103 The lawsuit came after Apple removed Fortnite, Epic’s popular battle-royal game, from its App Store for violating Apple’s terms of service by
offering a payment system that bypassed Apple’s IAP system. 104 Epic’s lawsuit alleged a total of ten counts against Apple, with six originating from the
Sherman Act and three violations of California’s Cartwright Act. 105 At the
heart of Epic’s lawsuit is the complex issue of tying in digital markets, raising important questions as to how antitrust in the modern era should be construed. 106

102. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 398.
103. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 44–60.
104. Nicas et al., supra note 5.
105. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 44–61.
106. Steven Pearlstein, Beating Up on Big Tech is Fun and Easy. Restraining it Will Require Rewriting the Law, WASH. POST (July 30, 2020, 9:48 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/2020/07/30/antitrust-amazon-apple-facebook-google [https://perma.cc/49WT-UUPG];
Ian Sherr, Apple’s Battle With Epic Games Could Lead to Big Changes in iPhone Apps, CNET
(Sept. 27, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apples-battle-with-epic-games-could-leadto-big-changes-in-iphone-apps/ [https://perma.cc/4K78-24Z6].
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A. Mobile Operating Systems and App Store Mechanics
Mobile devices, such as iPhones and Androids, use mobile application
stores (“app stores”) to distribute software applications (“apps”). 107 These
app stores allow users to browse various apps, install compatible apps, and
view or leave feedback on an app’s performance. 108 For third-party app developers, app stores are the primary or sole means of distribution for their
apps. Each app store dictates which apps are permitted, how app users pay
for their in-app purchases of digital goods, and what distribution of that inapp purchase’s revenue the app developer will receive. 109 In addition, some
apps charge a price for downloading the app itself or for subscribing to an
app, and the app store determines what portion of the download or subscription price the app developer will receive. 110 Mobile device companies, such
as Apple and Google, provide developers with the tools and support to build
compatible apps for their respective mobile operating systems. 111
A device’s mobile operating system (“OS”), like Android or iOS, will
determine which app store and apps are accessible to the user. 112 For example, a smartphone using Google’s Android OS will have access to the Google
Play Store, the primary app store for Android devices, and other Androidcompatible app stores, such as Amazon’s Appstore, Aptoide, F-Droid, and
the Samsung Galaxy Store. 113 In contrast, Apple’s App Store is the only app
store available for iOS smartphones. 114 Additionally, an app designed for
Android OS is not interoperable on Apple’s iOS; rather, an app developer

107. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 93.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 339.
111. Id. at 93.
112. Id. at 94.
113. Id. at 95.
114. Id.
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that wants its app to be available on both operating systems must create two
identical apps which are compatible with each distinctive mobile OS. 115
When a user makes an in-app purchase for digital goods from an app,
mobile app stores collect a “commission.” 116 Apple and Google have created
payment processing mechanisms linked to their app stores in order to collect
this commission whenever in-app purchases occur. 117 Yet, Apple and
Google do not collect any commissions on physical goods sold through apps
in their app stores. 118 For example, a user may purchase physical shoes from
an online retailer through an app on their mobile device. This purchase
would not be subject to any commission from the app store. However, if a
user purchases digital shoes for a virtual character through a mobile app, the
app store charges the third-party app developer a commission on each digital
goods sale. Apple charges the app developer a commission of 30% on every
in-app digital goods sale on Apple’s mobile devices. 119

B. Epic Games v. Apple
In its complaint, Epic alleged that Apple requires all app developers to
sign a contract where 30% of all in-app purchases of “digital goods and services” 120 must be paid to Apple. 121 The contract also prohibits app developers from devising any way to skirt Apple’s IAP system 122 and forbids developers from informing their iOS users that the app or its related digital goods

115. Id. at 94–95.
116. Id. at 98.
117. Id.
118. Matthew Ball, Apple, Its Control Over the iPhone, the Internet, and the Metaverse,
MATTHEWBALL.VC (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.matthewball.vc/all/applemetaverse [https://
perma.cc/94PN-4R6L]; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 98–99.
119. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 98.
120. Id. at 339.
121. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 1.
122. Id. at 1–2.

SMIZER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

232

5/16/2021 11:31 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:3

may be available for purchase at lower prices outside Apple’s App Store. 123
Apple also prohibits app developers from providing their iOS users with
“links outside of the app that may lead users to find alternative subscription
and payment methods.” 124 Plainly, all purchases of digital goods made by
iOS users must go through Apple, and Apple must be given its 30% commission. 125 If an app developer disagrees with these terms, they risk losing
access to the nearly 1 billion global iOS user base. 126 In its Answer to Epic’s
Complaint, Apple painted a different picture, claiming Epic engaged in “subterfuge” by uploading a “Trojan horse” version of Fortnite to the Apple App
Store equipped with new “commission-theft functionality.” 127
Meanwhile, Epic argued that Apple, through its “dominant position in
the mobile app store market and monopoly power over distribution of software applications on iOS devices,” 128 unlawfully tied the use of its iOS to
the Apple App Store and subsequently the IAP system. 129 In its Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Epic asserted that they seek only “the freedom not to
use Apple’s App Store or IAP, and instead to use and offer competing services.” 130 Epic argued that software distribution should be “as open and
competitive as it is on personal computers.” 131 However, U.S. District Judge
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers denied Epic’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
123. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 339.
124. Id.
125. See generally Nicas et al., supra note 5; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM.
supra note 8, at 339.

AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

126. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 3.
127. Defendant and Counterclaimant Apple, Inc.’s Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims
in Reply to Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 2, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple,
Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020).
128. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.
129. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 53.
130. Plaintiff Epic Games, Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 3, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple,
Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020).
131. Id. at 8.
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to reinstate Fortnite in Apple’s App Store. 132 Judge Rogers reasoned it
would be unfair to reinstate Epic’s game after Epic willfully breached its
contract with Apple. 133 Both parties agreed to a bench trial, set to begin on
May 3, 2021. 134
In its complaint, Epic alleged that Apple violates the Sherman Act by
tying the use of its iOS mobile device software to Apple’s App Store, and
thus to Apple’s IAP system. Epic claimed that Apple possesses durable market power and engages in exclusionary “gatekeeping” conduct in its iOS app
distribution market and in-app payment processing market. 135 Epic further
argued that Apple’s conduct rises to the level of per se tying and pled, in the
alternative, that Apple’s conduct violates the rule of reason standard of tying
arrangements. 136
To prevail on its per se tying claim, Epic would need to establish the
following: (1) the iOS system, the Apple App Store, and Apple’s IAP system
are separate products; (2) Apple has sufficient market power in the markets
of the tied products, iOS app distribution and iOS in-app payment processing; (3) consumers have no choice but to use both Apple’s App Store
and IAP system when using iOS mobile devices; and (4) Apple’s conduct
forecloses a substantial amount of commerce by tying the iOS mobile devices to the App Store, and thus to Apple’s IAP system. In the alternative,
under the rule of reason standard, Epic would not only need to satisfy the
above elements, but also demonstrate that any procompetitive benefits are
outweighed by anticompetitive harm from Apple’s tying arrangements.
However, the question as to whether Apple possesses the requisite market
132. Order Granting In Part And Denying In Part Motion For Preliminary Injunction at 38,
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020) (Epic’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction sought to both reinstate Fortnite in Apple’s App Store and protect access
for Epic Affiliates’ developer accounts and tools, such as the Unreal Engine. The Court denied
Epic’s motion in part, deciding Fortnite would not be reinstated in Apple’s App Store, and granted
in part Epic’s request to protect Epic Affiliates and enjoin Apple from taking any adverse action
that would suspend, restrict or terminate with Epic Affiliates’ status in Apple’s Developer Program.).
133. Id. at 29–30.
134. Case Scheduling and Pretrial Order at 2, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 4:20-cv05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020).
135. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.
136. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 54.

SMIZER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

234

5/16/2021 11:31 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:3

power will be determined by how the market at issue is ultimately defined.
To better understand Epic’s position, this case must be measured against two
key watershed cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit
Court, respectively, dealing with tying arrangements.

C. Aftermarket Liability: The Kodak Decision
When consumers buy equipment from an original equipment maker
(“OEM”), a secondary market or “aftermarket” may be created for complementary parts or services for the equipment. 137 By purchasing the original
equipment, some consumers are locked into or dependent upon the OEM’s
aftermarket for parts or service. 138 The Jefferson Hospital court previously
concluded that tying can also include “functionally linked products [where]
at least one of which is useless without the other.” 139 Essentially, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant “tied the sale of the two products” and
has “appreciable economic power in the tying market.” 140
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a landmark case dealing with
tying, expanding antitrust liability into derivative aftermarkets. 141 In Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services (“Kodak”), an independent service organization (“ISO”) brought suit against copy-machine manufacturer, Eastman Kodak, for enacting policies that made it more difficult for
ISOs to compete with Kodak for servicing Kodak’s copying machine

137. Salil Kumar, Parts and Service Included: An Information-Centered Approach to Kodak and the Problem of Aftermarket Monopolies, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1521, 1521 (1995) (“Durable
goods ranging from farm machinery to computer hardware invariably require service, supplies, or
replacement parts after their initial sale. The influence of original equipment makers (‘OEMs’) in
the secondary market (or ‘aftermarket’) for such complementary goods has attracted recent legal
attention.”).
138. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.01. “More recently, courts have been
concerned with the issue of market power when buyers are arguably locked into a market by virtue
of a prior purchase in a market in which the defendant did not have market power.” Id.
139. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 463 (1992) (citing Jefferson
Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 n.30 (1984)) (“We have often found arrangements
involving functionally linked products at least one of which is useless without the other to be prohibited tying devices.”).
140. Id. at 462–64.
141. Id. at 451.
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equipment. 142 First, the ISO plaintiff successfully argued that while the
products and services were “functionally linked,” separate markets existed
for each, similarly to separate markets existing for cameras and film, and
computers and software. 143 Second, the ISO plaintiff argued “Kodak has
more than sufficient power in the parts market to force unwanted purchases
of the tied market, service,” due to Kodak’s conduct of restricting the availability of parts and pressuring customers to use only Kodak servicing. 144 The
Court noted that a company possesses “market power” when it can “force a
purchaser to do something [they] would not do in a competitive market.” 145
The Supreme Court agreed that Kodak possessed sufficient market
power in the parts market to unlawfully influence the service aftermarket. 146
Further, the Court observed that, in theory, the extent to which a primary
market influences the aftermarket “depends on the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a price
change in another,” known as the “‘cross-elasticity of demand.’” 147 However, consumers may still continue to purchase products at a higher price and
may not strictly follow this theoretical rule. 148 Siding with the ISO plaintiff,
the Supreme Court held that even a natural monopolist may not “exploit his
dominant position in one market to expand his empire” into a derivative market. 149
This case mirrors Epic’s suit against Apple in a number of ways. Like
the Kodak ISO, Epic took issue with Apple’s anticompetitive conduct of
142. Id.
143. Id. at 463.
144. Id. at 464–65.
145. Id. at 489.
146. Id. at 470.
147. Id. at 469 (quoting United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
400 (1956)).
148. Id. at 474. “Even if competitors had the relevant information, it is not clear that their
interests would be advanced by providing such information to consumers. Moreover, even if consumers were capable of acquiring and processing the complex body of information, they may
choose not to do so.” Id.
149. Id. at 479 n.29 (quoting Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611
(1953)).
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tying iOS mobile devices to both the App Store and Apple’s IAP system,
effectively controlling both aftermarkets. 150 Similar to the Court’s approach
in Kodak, market definition will also be central to Epic’s case. The Court
rejected Kodak’s argument that by not possessing market power in the original equipment market, Kodak customers could switch to competing products from other OEMs. 151 Instead, the Court held that Kodak could raise
prices within the parts and service aftermarkets without losing meaningful
sales in the primary equipment market. 152 This ability to maintain customers,
the Court reasoned, was based on Kodak’s high switching costs imposed
upon their customers by purchasing Kodak equipment, creating a “captive
market” in Kodak’s parts and service aftermarkets. 153 Here, Epic similarly
argues the relevant tying product market is the aftermarket of iOS app distribution, rather than mobile operating systems at large. 154
Apple, like Kodak, has perhaps found an “optimal price” where they
may charge monopoly prices without “ruinous” consequences. 155 Once a
consumer purchases an iOS mobile device, they are effectively locked in to
both Apple’s App Store and Apple’s IAP system to purchase any digital
goods. 156 Apple does not permit iOS mobile users to sideload apps. 157 Furthermore, consumers face “significant barriers” when switching their mobile
devices, such as high costs, learning a new unfamiliar interface, and the difficulty of transferring data between devices. 158 Switching costs remain high
for iOS users because iOS and other compatible products are not available

1–2.

150. See generally Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at
151. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 56.
155. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 470–71 (1992).

156. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.
157. Id. at 97.
158. Id. at 102–03.
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on non-iOS devices, resulting in product “lock-in” for iOS users. 159 Apple’s
smartphone pricing consistently soars above the global average selling price
of smartphones, yet 91% of iOS users indicate they would continue to use
Apple products. 160 This is further evidenced by studies showing that 90% of
iOS users remain with Apple when purchasing a new smartphone device,
rather than switch to another operating system, such as Android. 161 Unlike
Kodak, Apple possesses between 50% and 60% of the U.S. market share of
the mobile operating system market. 162 In both the iOS app distribution market and iOS in-app payment processing market, Apple effectively controls
100% by prohibiting other means for consumers to download apps or make
in-app purchases. 163 Tackling a similar scenario of software bundling, the
D.C. Circuit Court returned to the issue of aftermarket tying in digital marketplaces and came to a considerably different decision. 164

D. Bundling Products: The Microsoft Decision
In 1998, the Department of Justice and twenty other states brought suit
against Microsoft, alleging that Microsoft had violated antitrust laws by tying the web browser, Internet Explorer, to its Windows operating system. 165
In 2000, the trial court ruled that, as a consequence of violating the antitrust
laws, Microsoft would be split into two companies—one for the Windows
OS and one for its software applications. 166 The Microsoft decision dealt
with the then-novel issue of bundling an operating system with another separate software, a web browser. 167
159. Id. at 102.
160. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 43.
161. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 102.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 97.
164. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
165. Jenkins & Bing, supra note 67, at 12.
166. Id. at 13–14.
167. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 34.
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Microsoft users received the Windows operating system with Internet
Explorer pre-installed and were not allowed to uninstall it. 168 Microsoft customers demanded other web browsing options and the freedom to use a competing internet browsing software instead of Internet Explorer. 169 On appeal,
the D.C. Circuit Court weighed the potential impact of bundling on consumer
demand for other competing products, and made the following observation:
“assuming choice is available at zero cost, consumers will prefer it to no
choice.” 170
Yet, the appellate court overturned the ordered split and disagreed as to
the previous tying verdict, holding that although Microsoft may not “be absolved of tying liability,” Microsoft was not liable under per se tying. 171 On
this basis, the court held that due to a lack of empirical evidence and meaningful experience adjudicating antitrust claims within the technology space,
the trial court incorrectly applied the per se label to Microsoft’s conduct. 172
The court remanded for the tying claim to be construed under the rule of
reason analysis where the plaintiffs must demonstrate Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct outweighed any procompetitive justifications. 173
Market definition again played a pivotal role in the Microsoft decision. 174 Microsoft argued that the trial court defined the primary market too
narrowly by examining only the worldwide market of Intel-compatible operating systems and excluding other operating systems, such as Mac OS from
Apple. 175 Yet, the appellate court ultimately rejected this argument because
consumers were unlikely to migrate from Windows OS to Mac OS due to
168. Id. at 84.
169. Id. at 88.
170. Id. at 87.
171. Id. at 89.
172. Id. at 94–95.
173. Id. at 95.
174. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02. (“In appealing the district court
holding, Microsoft made a number of arguments contesting this market definition and the inference
that it was indicative of market power. The first was that the market was defined too narrowly by
virtue of excluding the Apple Computer operating system Mac OS, operating systems for non-PC
devices like handheld units, and middleware.”).
175. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 52.
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high switching costs, incompatibilities between each OS, and the effort involved in learning the configuration of a new OS. 176 Further, the court reasoned that a firm cannot possess market power unless the market is also protected by “significant barriers to entry” from other competitors. 177
As discussed, Apple consumers face similar problems when changing
their mobile devices. Additionally, other potential competitors in either the
iOS app distribution market or in-app payment processing market are foreclosed from entering these markets as Apple maintains “gatekeeper power”
over these respective markets. 178 Therefore, Apple protects the market of
iOS app distribution and in-app payment processing by using the App Store
as the only method to distribute iOS-compatible apps. 179
This case draws a powerful distinction between Microsoft and Epic in
that Apple, unlike Microsoft, does not provide any other choice to its consumers than to use both the App Store and thus Apple’s IAP system. 180 An
iOS user, by virtue of using an iOS mobile device, must use Apple’s App
Store and Apple’s IAP system to access to a third-party developer’s content
and purchase digital goods. 181 The Apple App Store cannot be uninstalled
from an iOS mobile device, and a consumer cannot directly download iOScompatible programs from third-party developers. 182 An iOS user is limited
to what Apple permits through the App Store and thus subjects its customers

176. Id.
177. Id. at 82.
178. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.
179. Id.
180. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 3–4.
181. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 342 (“Many developers have stressed that, because Apple dictates that
the App Store is the only way to install software on iOS devices and requires apps offering “digital
goods and services” to implement the IAP mechanism, Apple has illegally tied IAP to the App
Store. Consumers with iOS devices account for a disproportionately high amount of spending on
apps—spending twice as much as Android users.”).
182. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 3–4; see also
Remove Built-In Apple Apps from the Home Screen on Your iOS 10 Device or Apple Watch, APPLE
SUPPORT, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204221# [https://perma.cc/93W7-GZT8].
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to any fees Apple ultimately imposes upon developers through its IAP system. 183
While this new generation of technology firms rely on technology not
anticipated by the Microsoft court, the analysis surrounding the Microsoft
decision sheds light on limitations of antitrust regulations today. 184 The Microsoft decision has been used by other courts to further carve out this “hightech exceptionalism” to antitrust enforcement. 185 In effect, “if a tie can be
said to improve a high-tech product in any way, the competitive effects of its
design are beyond antitrust reproach.” 186

IV. THE FUTURE OF ANTITRUST
“Technological tying” or “tech-tying” occurs when a firm with a dominant position in one market increases interoperability with its own products
by engaging in foreclosure of competition or leveraging. 187 This phenomenon of vertical integration in digital aftermarkets is omnipresent across all
major tech companies, including other large companies such as Microsoft,
Amazon, and Google. 188 These firms play an integral role in the American
digital economy, not just due to their significant and durable market power,
but also due to the services they provide, such as communication, commerce,
and information services that countless other industries consistently rely
upon. 189 However, the continued monopolization by these same firms has
substantially reduced “consumer choice, eroded innovation and entrepreneurship in the U.S. economy, weakened the vibrancy of the free and diverse
183. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 4.
184. Chris Butts, The Microsoft Case 10 Years Later: Antitrust and New Leading “New
Economy” Firms, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 285 (2010).
185. Rebecca H. Allensworth, Antitrust’s High-Tech Exceptionalism, 130 YALE L.J. F.
563, 603 (2021).
186. Id.
187. John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 681, 683 (2012).
188. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 287; see generally United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
189. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 10.
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press, and undermined Americans’ privacy.” 190 Firms exploit this monopolistic power to gain control of other vertical markets by “establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.” 191

A. Tech-Tying, Effective Through Leveraging
Leveraging is a broad theory within antitrust law, rather than a right of
action itself such as tying. Leveraging “occurs when a firm exploits its monopoly power in one market in order to extend that power to an adjacent
market, subsequently exercising market power in that market by raising
prices or restricting output or quality.” 192 Generally, leveraging “encompass[es] any form of conduct that makes it harder for third parties to distribute their products or services through a platform, while benefitting the platform owner’s competing product.” 193 Although the doctrine of leveraging
has “lost substantial favor,” demonstrating a defendant’s leverage may be
critical for plaintiffs attempting to prove a firm engaged in tech-tying. 194 In
the digital era, this manifests when platform owners pre-install their own
software as a means of self-promotion and block other developers from creating competing products. 195 Firms such as Apple create both the mobile
device operating system and the applications that “sit on top of” its own platforms. 196
This raises the question as to what exactly Apple is tying. Apple directly controls iOS mobile app distribution through the App Store. 197 By
funneling all app downloads and purchases through the App Store, Apple
190. Id. at 12.
191. Patrick F. Todd, Digital Platforms and the Leverage Problem, 98 NEB. L. REV. 486,
522 (2019) (quoting Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407–08 (2004)).
192. Id. at 488.
193. Id. at 489.
194. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
195. Todd, supra note 191, at 489.
196. Id. at 497.
197. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334–35.

SMIZER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

242

5/16/2021 11:31 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:3

can also require its consumers to use Apple’s IAP system. 198 In its complaint, Epic argues that Apple has unlawfully tied the App Store to Apple’s
IAP system. 199 This, however, may not capture the full scope of Apple’s
tying conduct.
The tying appears to be happening twofold: first, Apple conditions the
use of its mobile iOS operating system with the App Store as the sole means
of iOS-compatible app distribution; 200 and second, Apple ties the App Store
to its IAP system for making app-related purchases for virtual goods. 201 Apple compels the consumer to utilize its App Store without any competing
alternatives and prohibits users from deleting the Apple App Store. 202 As a
result, Apple is able to maintain its “gatekeeper” status over the app distribution market for iOS devices 203 and therefore require consumers and app
developers alike to use Apple’s IAP system. 204 App developers allege that
Apple “actively undermines the open web’s progress” on its own iOS devices in order to “to push developers toward building native apps on iOS
rather than using web technologies.” 205
Apple maintains complete control over iOS smartphones by disallowing any competitors in the aftermarkets of iOS app distribution and in-app

198. Id. at 339 (“Apps are not permitted to. . .offer their own payment processing mechanism in the app to avoid using Apple’s IAP.”).
199. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 53.
200. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 335.
201. See generally Remove built-in Apple apps from the Home screen on your iOS 10 device or Apple Watch, supra note 185; see also App Store Review Guidelines, 3.2.2. Unacceptable,
APPLE.COM (Feb. 1, 2021), https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/#in-app-purchase [https://perma.cc/R7T8-R9Y9]; see also Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief,
supra note 12, at 53.
202. See generally Remove built-in Apple apps from the Home screen on your iOS 10 device
or Apple Watch, supra note 185; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.
203. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.
204. Id. at 342.
205. Id. at 335.
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payment processing. 206 In the U.S., Apple enjoys “significant and durable”
market power in the smartphone, mobile operating system, and mobile app
store markets, with more than half of all domestic smartphones running on
Apple’s iOS. 207 Globally, Apple returned to the number one position at the
close of 2020 Q4 in the mobile device market, capturing 23.4% of the market
share with the highest shipment volume in history by a single vendor. 208 Apple thus leverages its market power in the iOS aftermarkets to require consumers and third-party developers to use Apple’s App Store and subsequently its IAP system. 209
In the instant case, the market at issue is not the smartphone market at
large. Like in Kodak and Microsoft, the market in question is the aftermarkets of in iOS app distribution and in-app payment processing. 210 Apple creates an absolute barrier to entry for third parties that either wish to distribute
iOS-compatible apps or provide alternative payment processing systems for
digital commerce on iOS smartphones. 211 The Apple App Store’s net revenue alone was estimated at $17.4 billion for the 2020 fiscal year. 212 Analytics have shown that, on its own, the App Store would rank at 64 in the Fortune 500. 213 Apple also has yet to produce any evidence that its App Store
is not the exclusive method of app distribution for iOS devices or that Apple
does not maintain monopoly control of these aftermarkets. 214
Through its tied products, Apple exerts a “supra-competitive” 30%
commission over developers which developers then pass on to the consumer
206. Id. at 334–35.
207. Id. at 334.
208. Smartphone Shipments Return to Positive Growth in the Fourth Quarter Driven by
Record Performance by Apple, According to IDC, IDC (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS47410621 [https://perma.cc/FVE5-ZDCU].
209. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 102, 334, 341–42.
210. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 16, 28.
211. See Ball, supra note 118.
212. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 344–45.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 335.
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by inflating in-app prices. 215 Due to consumer lock-in and high switching
costs, Apple may also be able to raise its commission on third-party developers without losing any meaningful consumer sales in the OEM market of
smartphones.
Apple argues that its 30% commission is “hardly unique” within the
industry and compares itself to other platform owners. 216 Apple invented
this 30% standard in 2009 when the tech company began enforcing its 30%
commission fees—a rate that has since become “the industry standard” for
digital goods. 217 Yet, the actual figure of 30% is not precisely the issue.
Apple has reduced this 30% commission to 15% for certain “reader” or subscription-based apps after its first operating year. 218 Further, Apple does not
exert the same 30% commission over purchases of physical items through
iOS apps. 219
The issue is that Apple has unparalleled discretion to implement arbitrary rules or fees—the “our bat, our ball, our rules” approach 220—to the detriment of other would-be competitors in the aftermarkets of iOS app

215. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 16–17 (“Apple also uses its power to exploit app developers through
misappropriation of competitively sensitive information and to charge app developers supra-competitive prices within the App Store . . . In the absence of competition, Apple’s monopoly power
over software distribution to iOS devices has resulted in harm to competitors and competition,
reducing quality and innovation among app developers, and increasing prices and reducing choices
for consumers.”); see also Nilay Patel, Apple’s App Store Fees are ‘Highway Robbery,’ says House
Antitrust Committee Chair, VERGE (June 18, 2020, 3:21 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6
/18/21295778/apple-app-store-hey-email-fees-policies-antitrust-wwdc-2020
[https://perma.cc
/KF3Y-EUQE] (House Antitrust Committee Chair Rep. David Cicilline: “You cannot simply allow
someone merely because they invented a system or a product to continue to enjoy that kind of
monopoly power . . . . It’s contrary to our laws. It’s unfair to new developers, new startups, and it
hurts consumers.”).
216. Apple, Inc.’s Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 5, Epic
Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020).
217. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 98.
218. Id. at 339–41.
219. Ball, supra note 118.
220. Ben Lovejoy, Opinion: Apple’s Antitrust Issues Won’t Go Away; the Company Should
Act Now, 9TO5MAC (June 17, 2020, 7:08 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2020/06/17/apples-antitrustissues/ [https://perma.cc/MP6T-ZDX4].
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distribution and in-app payment processing. 221 Apple’s 30% commission on
the sale of digital goods is “non-negotiable.” 222 Apple owns each adjacent
market which relies on the former, thus leveraging its complete market
power over these iOS aftermarkets. 223 Should an app developer disagree
with Apple’s policies, they risk losing access to over one-billion iOS users. 224
Furthermore, other competitors operate in the payment processing market at large— and at a much cheaper price. 225 It has been speculated that
Apple’s expenses to run the App Store, when compared against the revenue
made from the App Store, would justify charging no more than 3.65% to app
developers. 226 As one app developer suggested, Apple’s stance on the status
of its payment system “distorts competition in payment processing by making access to its App Store conditional on the use of [Apple’s] IAP for inapp purchases, thus excluding alternative payment processors.” 227 Like
Epic, other developers would prefer to offer in-house payment processing
options, as is customary with many online retailers selling physical goods. 228

B. Apple’s Anticompetitive Conduct Outweighs Any Procompetitive
Justifications
Like the Microsoft case, Epic urged the court to evaluate Apple’s tying
under the per se approach or, in the alternative, under the rule of reason
221. Ball, supra note 118 (“[Apple] is inhibiting this future Internet. And it does so via
tolls, controls, and technologies that not only deny what made and still makes the open web so
powerful, but also prevents competition, and prioritize Apple’s own profits.”).
222. Id.
223. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 16-17; see also Patel, supra note 215.
224. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 3.
225. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8.
226. Id. (“Other developers have noted that alternative payment processing providers
charge significantly lower rates than Apple’s fee for IAP. Match Group estimates that Apple’s
expenses related to payment processing ‘justify charging no more than 3.65% of revenue.’”).
227. Id. at 343.
228. Id. at 346.
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analysis. 229 Under a rule of reason analysis, Epic would also have to demonstrate “the anticompetitive effects of tying . . . [outweigh] the procompetitive
justifications for the arrangement.” 230 In response, Apple asserts its conduct
should be protected from redress under antitrust laws due to Apple’s “legitimate business justifications.” 231 Apple claimed that its conduct was reasonable “at all times” and “undertaken in good faith to advance legitimate business interests and had the effect of promoting, encouraging, and increasing
competition.” 232
Apple presents various justifications for its conduct, such as the claim
that linking its app store to its iOS is a “product-design decision,” meant to
protect its “integrated tech ecosystem.” 233 Apple also argues that it uses the
App Store as a security measure to protect its users from any potentially malicious apps by thoroughly vetting all apps it permits in the App Store. 234
Additionally, Apple characterizes its 30% fee as a commission or distribution fee, rather than a payment processing fee, insisting that the fee “reflects
the value of the App Store as a channel for the distribution of developers’
apps and the cost of many services” incurred by Apple to maintain the App
Store. 235 Apple further asserts that it maintains control over the App Store
to ensure that all iOS apps are up to Apple’s “high standards for privacy,
security, content, and quality.” 236 Apple’s rationale for this 30% fee has also
evolved over time. 237 For example, back in 2011, Apple CFO Peter Oppenheimer claimed the fee charged by the App Store was implemented to ensure
229. See Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 54.
230. Piraino, Jr., supra note 88, at 104.
231. Apple, Inc.’s Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims, supra note 127, at 36.
232. Id.
233. Allensworth, supra note 185, at 603.
at 5.

234. Apple, Inc.’s Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 217,

235. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 343.
236. Apple, Inc.’s Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims, supra note 127, at 4.
237. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 344.
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that Apple received “just a little over break even” in exchange for operating
the App Store. 238
However, Epic noted in its Complaint that Apple fails to exert similar
control over its personal computers. 239 Apple’s MacBook users are free to
download programs outside of the Apple-controlled App Store and can make
direct purchases outside of the IAP system. 240 Consumers can still access
Fortnite through their Apple computers, without having to route through the
Apple App Store to download the game or use Apple’s IAP system to purchase any virtual goods. 241 This indicates that the alleged privacy concerns
Apple raises extend only to its mobile devices and not its personal computers. Apple also does not impose its typical 30% commission for the purchase
of physical goods, 242 suggesting that this fee operates more arbitrarily than
Apple claims.
Kodak similarly argued its tying arrangement was justified for the following reasons: “(1) to promote inter-brand equipment competition by allowing Kodak to stress the quality of its service; (2) to improve asset management by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs; and (3) to prevent ISOs from
free-riding on Kodak’s capital investment in equipment, parts and service.” 243 Yet, the Court rejected Kodak’s justifications, calling attention to
Kodak’s inconsistent actions and failure to provide adequate evidence to
supports its alleged justifications. 244 As in Kodak, Apple’s justifications
likely do not outweigh the anticompetitive nature of Apple’s conduct. Apple, in allowing such freedom on its other devices, demonstrates Apple can
financially afford to allow competing iOS app distributors, and that data privacy concerns are not a legitimate business justification.

238. Id.
239. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 6.
240. Id. at 22.
241. Id. at 6.
242. Ball, supra note 118.
243. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992).
244. Id. at 484–85.
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C. Shifting the Antitrust Paradigm
Accordingly, both the iOS app distribution and in-app payment processing are two distinct markets, even if Apple’s products are functionally
linked. Therefore, presently or on appeal, the Court should find that Apple
has unlawfully conditioned the use of its iOS platforms to its App Store, and
thus to its IAP system. Apple owns both the hardware, the iPhone, and the
operating system, iOS, and thus conditions the operability of Apple’s own
apps and all third-party apps on the use of Apple’s App Store to operate the
mobile device as a whole. 245 Apple goes a step further to exert additional
control over any in-app sales of digital goods by tying its IAP system to its
App Store, the sole means of app distribution for iOS devices. 246 Each step
in this vertical chain represents distinct markets: the smartphone market, the
iOS app distribution market, and the iOS in-app payment processing market.
Apple uses its market dominance in the iOS mobile device market to unfairly
leverage and ultimately control the aftermarkets of both iOS app distribution
and in-app payment processing. 247 Apple’s market power may manifest in a
variety of ways, such as “lower quality, lower privacy protection, less creation of new business/entry, less variety of political viewpoints, and, importantly, less investments in innovation.” 248
The courts should seek a balance between promoting fair market structures and protecting the right of technology companies to exert control over
their product by extending antitrust protection to entrepreneurs and independent businesses. 249 In the absence of retroactively splitting monopolistic
tech companies, courts should scrutinize a company’s potential threat of vertical integration and how a company may leverage this power in aftermarkets. By moving away from “high-tech exceptionalism,” the courts should
reject the Microsoft rationale that improving a high-tech product grants a
245. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 53.
246. Id.; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 342.
247. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334–46.
248. STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS, GEORGE J. STIGLER CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF THE ECON. AND ST., FINAL REPORT, 8 (2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms—-committee-report—-stigler-center.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/8CMP-W8Q7].
249. Id. at 392.
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firm reprieve from antitrust enforcement. 250 The courts should thus abandon
the short-sighted, consumer-centered paradigm of antitrust, opting instead to
examine the “competitive process itself” by scrutinizing both the structure
of the firm and the relevant markets. 251 In finding for Epic, the Court here
would demonstrate that tech firms cannot evade meaningful antitrust enforcement where their conduct hinders competition.
Given the confused state of current law, it would benefit the courts if
Congress were to provide clarity through legislation. Among other things,
the legislature should direct courts to protect competition in addition to consumers when adjudicating antitrust claims. In strengthening scrutiny of vertical restraints, the legislature can make this clear: tech-tying is anticompetitive conduct. While the courts may be slow to clarify antitrust
jurisprudence, legislative changes would offer “faster and more certain” path
to antitrust enforcement against the emerging trend of tech-tying. 252 As an
increasing number of U.S. markets are controlled by a shrinking number of
firms, the legislature must act now to implement antitrust reform. 253

D. Looking Forward
The same day Epic filed suit against Apple, Apple announced its plans
to launch “AppleOne,” a product that will bundle their existing services of
streaming, music, iCloud storage, news and much more. 254 As a consumer,
the prospect of finally combining all streaming services may be exciting, as
it will allow many to cut down on various virtual subscriptions. Apple will
offer a way to streamline and simplify this process, for seemingly less
money. 255 Consequently, it may be difficult to imagine how restricting Apple would benefit the consumer when Apple brings remarkable convenience
250. Allensworth, supra note 185, at 602–03.
251. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 717 (2017).
252. Steven C. Salop, Dominant Digital Platforms: Is Antitrust Up to the Task?, 130 YALE
L.J. F. 563, 586 (2021).
253. Khan, supra note 251, at 803–04.
254. Mark Gurman, Apple Readies Subscription Bundles to Boost Digital Services,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-13
/apple-readies-apple-one-subscription-bundles-to-boost-services?sref=18veDlX6
[https://perma.cc/3FJZ-FC2Y].
255. Id.
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to our lives. However, this again raises the central issue—how much control
should Apple be allowed to exert? A $2 trillion market cap company is unprecedented, 256 as is the technology at consumers’ fingertips.
Since the filing of Epic’s lawsuit, other companies such as Spotify
Technology SA and Match Group Inc. have joined Epic against these tech
giants by creating the Coalition For App Fairness. 257 The Coalition’s mission is to promote “fair treatment by these app stores and the platform owners
who operate them.” 258 As “Big Tech” companies clash with smaller thirdparty developers, the courts and legislature will face an increasing need for
clear guidance on how best to navigate complex antitrust issues. The legislature must also enact reforms to antitrust laws to account for the growing
phenomenon of tech-tying and clarify the confusing standards for analyzing
tying claims, both within and beyond technological markets. 259

V. CONCLUSION
Epic should prevail on its claims of tying against Apple. While Apple
has every right to operate its own App Store and offer services exclusive to
its devices, Apple cannot be permitted to continue this “forced bundling.” 260
The solution is clear: allow iOS users to download iOS-compatible apps
from other sources and allow app developers to use alternative payment processing systems. 261 This does not preclude Apple from offering both its own
App Store as a means of iOS app distribution and Apple’s IAP system as an
in-app payment mechanism. Both may serve as competing options for iOS
users.

256. Klebnikov, supra note 6.
257. Mark Gurman, Spotify, Match Launch Coalition to Protest App Store Rules,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2020, 3:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-24
/spotify-match-launch-coalition-to-protest-app-store-rules [https://perma.cc/877T-UJLW].
258. Our Vision for the Future, COALITION FOR APP FAIRNESS, https://appfairness.org
/our-vision/ [http://archive.today/EMNDo].
259. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 8.
260. Ball, supra note 118.
261. Id.

SMIZER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

EPIC GAMES V. APPLE

5/16/2021 11:31 PM

251

However, Epic will face significant hurdles due to the current judicial
hostility toward antitrust 262 and inconsistent tying jurisprudence. 263 Epic is
hardly alone in experiencing Apple’s anti-competitive behavior and consumers may have little hope in overcoming the steep cost of switching platforms.
Absent any meaningful intervention by the legislature to also codify laws
prohibiting the practice of tech-tying in digital aftermarkets, Apple and other
“Big Tech” firms’ conduct may remain entirely unchecked.
This result may be counter-intuitive to our sense of intellectual property
rights and conflict with deregulatory free-market ideology. It is true that
Apple creates technology that many consider essential to our daily lives.
You may be reading this Comment on your MacBook or scrolling on your
iPhone. However, the “our bat, our ball, our rules” 264 mentality of high-tech
firms will inevitably leave consumers, entrepreneurs, and other smaller companies vulnerable. Unregulated capitalism has consistently trended toward
the formation of monopolistic firms with incredible power to wield over consumers and competitors alike. 265 In order for healthy competition to thrive,
fair conditions must be maintained and cultivated through both the courts
and the legislature to prevent further monopolization in high-tech markets.

262. See generally SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.
263. Id.
264. Lovejoy, supra note 220.
265. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.

